Frank Lonardelli / Uncategorized

Frank Lonardelli

Frank Lonardelli

Frank Lonardelli, Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
While most website are being designed, developes usually add pseudo latin text. I prefer you use my Game Theory papers. At least using strategy as a temp is more relevant to Commercial Realestate than some filler.


a) Parametric games have a fixed world.

Strategic games involve playing with someone else.


b) Games of pure conflict tend to be zero sum, i.e. a winner and a loser.

Coordination games: where players have the same “movement” problem i.e. left and right lane driving.

Mixed-motive games have a combination of conflict and coordination such as a PD.

 Frank Lonardelli Commercial Realestate Development, Calgary.


c) payoff: the actual result in each box.

choice matrix refers to the order of your preference over the payoff.

d) evolutionary strategies function on payoffs (H-land/gene pool survival).

deliberative strategies: what two players do if they have the opportunity to think about preferences and is choice matrix based (social evolution).



e) Satisficing: taking only as much as necessary to perform a function.

Maximizing: is taking as much as you possibly can.


f) A PD has               choice matrix

  Frank Lonardelli

Chicken has


g) divisible cooperative dividend: can be divided such as two pennies;

indivisible cooperative dividend: not divisible in the actual situation even if it can be in principle such as a baby.
h) Bargaining Dilemma: an onion skinned series of games of chicken to as many layers as the divisible dividend can be divided to solve the PD if it is solvable.
i) narrow compliance: seeking as much a dividend as one can possibly get.

Broad compliance: when a person takes any deal so long as their condition improves.

j) internalism: a dilemma solution that alters the algorithm of a player’s way of processing eg. Gautier’s pill. Externalism: a solution that involves altering the outcome matrix in a way that alters the player’s preferences in a way the removes the dilemma eg. Hobbes’ sovereign.

k) four problems with externalism:

expense, the “leg breaker” costs resources;

corruptible, the leg breaker may be bribed;

boot strapping, who pays the “leg breaker” can create a bargaining dilemma;

“empirical inadequacy,” why would a player obey?


l) dispositional dualism: Gautier’s MBA, has CM and SM

pluralism: Danielson’s AM has UC,CC,RC,UD

m) UC cooperates with everyone,

CC cooperates with UC and CC,

RC cooperates with RC and CC,

UD doesn’t cooperate.


n) if a disposition does better than any player in the existing pool it has rational superiority.

Equilibrium: population state where a player gets the same score regardless of the disposition the players enters as.

o) parametric robustness: an infinite number of dispositions.



p) iterated: allowing players to change dispositions between rounds.

non-iterated: players can’t change dispositions between rounds

q) one-shot: your score after one round.

multiple rounds: used to find out how population reaches equilibrium


r) epochs of interest: the number of rounds of interest.


s) differential and shared scrutiny, cost to read a players disposition;

autophany, resources you spend displaying your disposition;

dissimulation costs, the mis-showing of your disposition.


t) plasticity: the ability to jump to sub algorithms;

toggle-ability: the point to default to UD



u) dislodgement: conditions below which you fall out of the game;

invasion conditions: the number of players allowed to enter per round.

v) self-effacement: when you give up a current desire.


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